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1. Introduction
A well-established result in vertical product differentiation models is that a duopoly
consisting of high and low quality firms leads to product quality dispersion that is too
high and average levels of quality that are too low relative to the socially optimal
outcome (see Crampes and Hollander 1995). This result has been established under the
assumption that markets are fully covered, i.e., that all consumers purchase positive
quantities of the good in question. A consequence of full market coverage is that, even
though duopoly qualities differ from the socially optimal ones, the quantities produced by
the firms are always equivalent.
When the market is partially covered the nature of duopoly equilibrium depends
on whether the costs of production are fixed or variable.1 In both cases, however, if the
duopoly and socially optimal outcomes differ, then not only the qualities but also the
quantities will differ across outcomes. The direction of these differences is not clear,
because in the literature on partial market coverage the socially optimal outcome has
remained an open issue. Our work fills an important gap concerning the socially
optimum. We characterize the properties of socially optimal qualities and solve for the
divergence between duopoly and social outcomes when a market is partially covered.
Unlike other work, we analyze and compare both cases of fixed and variable costs.2
1 In the vertical product differentiation literature, “fixed costs” refer to zero marginal and
average costs of producing the product itself, but positive and convex costs of providing
product quality. Term “variable cost” in turn refers to the case where production has constant
average and marginal costs, but quality provision has positive and convex costs.
2 Under the assumption of fixed costs, Ronnen (1991) considers minimum quality standards
without analyzing socially optimal quality provision. Lambertini (1996), in turn, considers the
2Our main objective is to compare socially optimal qualities and quantities with the
duopoly solution. Thus, we take for granted that there exists a duopoly equilibrium
exhibiting partial coverage. Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) were the first to provide
sufficient conditions for a market equilibrium with at most two firms providing distinct
qualities and enjoying positive profits. Wauthy (1996) further showed that the
distribution of consumers and endogenous quality choices determine if the market is
partially or completely served. Acharyya (1998) focused on the problem of a monopoly
providing one or two variants of a good.
When analyzing socially optimal outcomes under variable costs, we characterize
the social optimum in the same way that Crampes and Hollander (1995) did for the fully
covered market case. For fixed costs we follow Ecchia et al. (2002), who showed that it is
optimal to provide just one quality level; however, they did not study the problem of
socially optimal price setting, nor did they analyze how the fixed cost case may differ
from the variable cost case. Like other work, our duopoly outcome is solved as the
subgame perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game. Firms maximize profits by first
competing in qualities and then competing in prices.
Our characterization of the socially optimal outcome provides several new
findings. First, under fixed costs, the social planner should provide one quality variant
and charge a uniform price that just covers the costs of quality provision. The social
optimum entails the market being partially covered, and less of the market is covered
compared to the duopoly equilibrium with two quality variants. Second, under variable
variable cost case but does not examine the socially optimal outcome. Motta (1993) allows for
both variable and fixed costs with partial market coverage but does not explicitly solve for the
socially optimal outcome. Instead he uses numerical illustrations to compare consumer surplus
in the different equilibria.
3costs, both quality variants are socially optimal, but unlike with fully covered markets
their market shares need not to be equal. Third, we find that the quality spread in the
duopoly equilibrium is too wide under variable costs.  Under fixed costs, a duopoly
produces two variants with too low quality relative to the one socially optimal variant.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents a basic duopoly model and the profit
maximizing solution with partial market coverage for both fixed and variable costs of
production. In Section 3 we compare the socially optimal and profit-maximizing
qualities.  Finally, we provide a brief conclusion.
2. A Duopoly Model of Vertical Product Differentiation with Partial
Market Coverage
Under an assumption of partial market coverage, each consumer is typically assumed to
purchase either one unit of a good or nothing.  Let a consumer have a utility function u
(see e.g. Tirole 1988, pp 96-97, 296-298),
kk psu -= q , (1)
where ks and kp  are the quality and price of the kth good.
3 In (1), q  represents the
consumer’s taste parameter, so that the consumer derives a surplus equal to kk ps -q
from a good of quality ks and price kp . Suppose there are two possible qualities of goods
produced by two types of firms, k = H (high quality) and k = L (low quality). Consumers’
4taste parameters are assumed to be uniformly distributed over qualities on a definite
interval, [ ]qqq ,Î , with 1=-qq  (see e.g. Motta 1993, or Cremer and Thisse 1999).
We assume that the high and low quality firms have quadratic and convex cost
functions for providing quality,
LHbssc kkk ,kfor2
1)( 2 == .        (2)
Because consumers can purchase either one unit or nothing of each good, the consumer
who is indifferent between the high and low quality goods has a threshold taste parameter
defined by
LH
LH
ss
pp
-
-
=qˆ . Under partial market coverage, some consumers do not enter
the market. Here, the lowest marginal willingness to pay parameter value can be defined
for the consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying the good, i.e.,
L
Lc
s
p
=q .  Partial market coverage additionally requires that
L
L
s
p
<q .  Under the uniform
distribution for the taste parameter, demands for high and low quality products become
qq ˆ-=Hq  and
c
Lq qq -= ˆ , where Hq  and Lq  are the number of consumers purchasing
from the low and high quality firm, respectively.
Based on the above assumptions, we will focus on cases where the costs of
providing quality are either fixed or variable with respect to production. The fixed cost
case might be interpreted as a situation where firms engage in R&D activities to improve
quality. Kuhn (2000) argued that the variable cost case might be more realistic than the
3 Throughout the paper, derivatives of functions with one argument will be denoted by primes,
while partial derivatives will be denoted by subscripts of functions with many arguments.
5fixed cost case, because it avoids an implausible feature of fixed costs. This is that the
high quality firm has both higher profits and a larger market share in equilibrium.4 In
conformity with observations from practice, our variable cost case results in an
equilibrium where the profits of the high quality firm are higher than those of the low
quality firm. However, the market share of the high quality firm is lower than that of the
low quality firm.
2.1 Price and Quality Games: Fixed costs
An analysis of duopoly competition under fixed costs of production was originally
provided by Ronnen (1991) and further analyzed by Wauthy (1998). We first briefly
develop some features of this model. When the cost of quality provision is fixed in terms
of quantity produced, then given the demands kq and the cost function in (2), the profit
functions of the high and low quality firm are:
)( kkkkk scqp -=p , for LHk ,= .   (3)
Playing a two-stage game, the firms maximize their profits by competing first in
qualities (stage 1) and then competing in prices (stage 2). Firms are assumed to move
4 This result was originally discovered by Lehmann-Grube (1997). He also showed that it holds
irrespective of whether the firms choose their qualities simultaneously or sequentially.
6simultaneously in each stage.5 We can solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this
game. This equilibrium relies, as usual, on commitment by firms in terms of quality.
In the second stage, firms choose prices given the costs of quality production.
From the first-order conditions of (3), 0=¶¶ H
H pp  and 0=¶¶ L
L pp , we can solve for
the optimal prices and their difference as follows,
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4
))(2(** q    (4)
Thus, duopoly prices depend on quality differences and the upper bound of the consumer
taste distribution. The lower bound of the taste distribution does not matter here, because
in partially covered markets the lowest critical value of marginal willingness to pay is
endogenous.
Inserting the above prices into the respective profit functions yields the indirect
profit functions for each firm’s choice of quality,
2
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Differentiating equations in (5) with respect to qualities gives,
5 Lambertini (1996) has shown that the simultaneous move game is the only pure strategy
equilibrium possible for a partial market coverage model with variable costs of producing
quality.
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Solving these first-order conditions for high and low quality and their difference with
Mathematica yields,
b
sH
2253311.0 q
=* ;
b
sL
20482383.0 q
=* ;
b
ss LH
22050727.0 q
=- ** . (7)
Thus, equilibrium duopoly qualities and the quality difference between firms depend
positively on the square of the upper bound of taste distribution, 2q , and negatively on
the marginal cost parameter of quality provision, b.
Using these optimal qualities, we can now solve for the prices and demands of
both quality variants as a function of exogenous parameters:
b
pH
3107662.0 q
=* ;
b
pL
3010251.0 q
=* ; q524994.0=*Hq ; q262497.0=
*
Lq . The addition of demands, which
indicates the resulting coverage in the market, is therefore given by
q787491.0=+ ** LH qq .
6  If for the moment we normalize 1=q  (and 0=q ), then we can
directly conclude that about 79% of consumers enter the market and buy one of the two
quality variants.  Because the high quality firm charges a higher price and faces a larger
demand, it has higher profits and greater market share than the low quality firm.  This can
6 It is easy to verify that our results fulfill conditions A and A’ for partial market coverage under
zero costs of quality provision proved in Wauhty (1996).
8also be seen from the profit solutions for high and low quality firms, i.e.,
bH
40244386.0 qp =  and
bL
400152741.0 qp = .  In the next section we show that this
result must be modified for the case of variable costs of production.
2.2 Price and Quality Games: Variable costs
Now we assume that the costs of providing quality are variable in terms of production
(see e.g. Motta 1993 and Lehmann-Grube 1997). Under this assumption, and given
demands kq  and the cost function in (2), the profit functions for each firm are written,
[ ] kkkkk qscp )(-=p , for LHk ,= . (8)
As before, in the second stage firms choose prices given the costs of quality production.
From the first-order conditions, 0=¶¶ H
H pp  and 0=¶¶ L
L pp , we can solve for the
following optimal prices,
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9Again, duopoly prices and their difference depend on quality differences and on the upper
bound of the consumer taste distribution.
Substituting these optimal prices into the profit functions, indirect profits in terms
of quality can be expressed as,
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Optimal second stage qualities then follow from the first-order conditions,
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where [ ])2(4 LHH ssbs ++-=W q  and [ ])(2 2 LHH ssbs ++=L q .
Given the complexity of the first-order conditions, solving for the actual
equilibrium qualities is a bit laborious. Without loss of generality we define LH dss =  for
some 1>d , where d indicates the degree of product differentiation between firms
expressed in terms of the quality spread between high and low quality firms. Note that
this assumption does not predetermine the results presented later concerning differences
between socially optimal and duopoly outcomes.
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Using LH dss = and solving (11a) - (11b) with Mathematica, we obtain the
following equilibrium qualities and their difference,
b
sH
28195.0 q
=* ;
b
sL
23987.0 q
=* ,
b
ss LH
24208.0 q
=- ** .       (12)
The equilibrium duopoly qualities and the degree of quality differentiation are positive
functions of the upper bound of the square of the taste distribution, 2q , and a negative
function of the marginal cost parameter of quality provision, b. This result is qualitatively
similar to that found in full market coverage models.
Note also that the quality difference is higher with variable costs compared to the
fixed cost case. This can be interpreted as follows. Under fixed costs, the costs of
producing both quality variants of the good in the second stage are zero (even though the
costs of providing quality differ). Under variable costs the costs of providing both quality
variants in the second stage are strictly positive. Thus under variable costs of production,
quality competition between the firms is tighter, because the firms obtain greater rents
from differentiating compared to the fixed cost case.
Finally, using the optimal qualities above, we can solve the previous first-order
conditions for equilibrium prices and demands to obtain
b
pH
2453313.0 q
=* ;
b
pL
215002.0 q
=* ; q279245.0=*Hq ; q344503.0=
*
Lq . The firms’ indirect profit
functions can now be solved to obtain
b
H
30328129.0~ qp = ;
b
L
3024298.0~ qp = .
Interestingly, for the case of variable costs of production, the high quality firm has higher
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profits but lower market share than the low quality firm. The overall demand (coverage)
in the market is given by q623748.0=+ ** LH qq . Thus, under variable costs, overall market
coverage is smaller than in the case of fixed costs. This is a natural result since
production costs are now positive and the quality spread is wider, which serves to relax
price competition between firms and allows them to charge higher prices.
3. Socially Optimal versus Profit-Maximizing Quality Decisions
Now we turn to the determination of socially optimal qualities and the relationship of
these with equilibrium duopoly qualities, under both assumptions of fixed and variable
costs of production. The socially optimal qualities are those that maximize a social
welfare function, defined as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus,
LHLH CSCSSW pp +++= .
3.1 Fixed Costs and the Socially Optimal Qualities
We start by analyzing the properties of the first-best solution under fixed costs. Noting
that the good is produced at zero marginal cost yields the following social welfare
function,
LHLH ccdsdsSW
c
--+= òò qqqq
q
q
q
q
ˆ
ˆ
 . (13)
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where we have used qq
q
q
dpsCS HH
H )(
ˆ
-= ò , qq
q
q
dpsCS LL
L
c
)(
ˆ
-= ò ,
HH
H cdp -= ò qp
q
qˆ
, and LL
L cdp
c
-= ò qp
q
q
ˆ
, with 2
2
1
HH bsc = and
2
2
1
LL bsc =  from (2).
In (13), the integrals indicate the size of demand for both variants. As the costs of
producing quality are lump sum in this case, they are independent of the size of demand.
The social planner simultaneously chooses prices and qualities to maximize (13).
The planner accounts for the critical taste parameter separating consumers of high and
low quality variants, while keeping it open whether it is socially optimal to serve the
whole market or not. Thus, the planner uses the following critical values of the taste
parameter,
LH
LH
ss
pp
-
-
=qˆ ; qq =c .          (14)
Using (14) and differentiating first the social welfare function (13) with respect to
high and low quality prices gives LH pp = .
7 Inserting this into the social welfare function
and differentiating it with respect to high and low qualities yields,
0)2(
2
1 2 =-= Hs bsSW H q , 0)2(2
1 2 =--= Ls bsSW L q . (15)
7 The first-order conditions for the prices of the high and low variants are
0=
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L
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Solving for optimal high quality gives
b
swH 2
2q
= . Note however that 0<
Ls
SW , implying
production of the low quality variant is zero. Thus, it is socially optimal to provide just
one quality variant (high quality),
b
sw
2
2q= , as pointed out by Ecchia et al. (2002).
We can compare the socially optimal solution and the duopoly in two ways, by
relating high and average qualities in the duopoly equilibrium to the quality of the single
socially optimal variant. Average quality can be solved with the help of (7) and related
demands, which gives
b
sa
2
* 184953.0 q= . For the quality difference we obtain,
0246689.0
2
* <-=-
b
ss wH
q                (16)
Hence, a duopoly provides both too little high and average quality relative to the socially
optimal solution. This implies profit maximization results in quality dispersion that is
socially suboptimal, and even the level of high quality provided is lower than the quality
of the single socially optimal variant. We summarize these findings in:
Proposition 1. Under fixed costs of production, the socially optimal outcome involves
production of only the high quality variant. Compared to the socially optimal outcome,
the profit maximizing duopoly provides two variants, and even the high quality provided
by the duopoly is lower than that of the single socially optimal variant.
Using the socially optimal qualities, we can also solve for socially optimal prices.
Inserting the optimal qualities above into the first-order conditions for prices implies that
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the optimal price is zero, because for the given quality and its costs, the cost of
production is zero. This cannot, however, be optimal in the long run, as costs of
providing quality would remain unpaid. Therefore, we use a pricing rule consistent with
the principle of long run optimality, which requires that not only variable but also fixed
costs to be paid.8 Drawing on this principle, we next examine optimal price setting for the
socially optimal single variant, focusing on consequences for covering the market.
Intuition suggests that the costs of quality provision and the consumer taste distribution
will jointly define if the market becomes covered or not. More specifically, we
demonstrate
Proposition 2. Under fixed costs of production, the social planner (i) provides one
quality variant and charges a uniform price that just covers the costs of quality provision,
(ii) serves half of the market, and less than the duopoly, if the original duopoly
equilibrium only partially covers the market, and (iii) a general condition for the market
to become fully covered given a taste distribution 1=-qq  is that 2³q .
Proof:
Part (ii). Define the critical consumer just buying the good by qq ³c . The price which
just covers the costs of the single variant is )(8/4 cw bp qqq -= . Using this price in the
indifference relation, 0=- wwc psq , the value of the critical taste parameter is
2/qq =c .  The market will be partially covered if cqq <  and fully covered if cqq ³ .
Recalling that 1=-qq , the latter condition can be re-expressed as 2³q . Finally, for
duopoly equilibrium we have as the critical taste parameter, qq 2.0=c , which is less
than above. Thus, the market is uncovered.
8 This principle is similar to a reasonable requirement that in the long run a social planner must run a
balanced budget.
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Part (i). Suppose now that the planner charges a price Wpp >¢ . Under higher price the
indifference relation, 0=¢-¢ ps wq , implies cqq >¢ . Then, 0)()( >¢- pSWpSW w ,
indicating that charging higher price reduces social welfare (see Appendix). Suppose next
that the planner charges a price Wpp <¢¢ . Then the fixed costs of serving the market
would not be gathered, which contradicts the long run optimality condition. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 is new in the literature. It demonstrates that the socially optimal
pricing strategy implies partial coverage if the duopoly equilibrium serves only part of
the market. We contrast the properties of the social optimum and the duopoly equilibrium
for the fixed cost case in Table 1.
Table 1. Duopoly and Social optimum in the fixed cost case
Duopoly equilibrium Social optimum
qq 2.0=c qq 5.0=c
bsH /253311.0
2q=*
bsL /0482383.0
2q=* bs
w /5.0 2q=
bpH /107662.0
3q=*
bpL /010251.0
2q=* bp
w /25.0 3q=
q787491.0=+ ** LH qq q5.0=
wq
Interestingly, the socially optimal price is higher than the price of the high quality variant
in the duopoly equilibrium. This naturally follows for two reasons: the absence of
differentiation and the higher quality of the product in the social optimum. Consequently,
a smaller share of the market becomes served, as indicated by the last row of Table 1.
Hence, the duopoly equilibrium and the social optimum differ in many respects.
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3.2 Variable Costs and the Socially Optimal Qualities
Next we compare the duopoly solution with the socially optimal one under variable costs
of production. Summing up consumers’ and producers’ surplus and recognizing that,
unlike with fixed costs of production, the assumption of variable production costs allows
the social welfare maximizer to offer products at a nonzero marginal cost, we obtain the
following social welfare function (see Crampes and Hollander 1995 and Lambertini
1996),
qqqq
q
q
q
q
dcsdcsSW LLHH
c
)()(
ˆ
ˆ
-+-= òò . (13’)
For the variable cost case, HCS  , LCS , Hc , and Lc are as defined before, but we have
now used qp
q
q
dcp HH
H )(òˆ -= , and qp
q
q
dcp
c
LL
L )(
ˆ
ò -= .  We will also replace the
duopoly prices by the marginal costs of quality provision in the definition of the critical
taste parameters qˆ  and cq . Hence, in (13’), the new threshold critical taste parameters
for the upper and lower bounds of the taste distribution (derived from the conventional
indifference relations) become,
)(
2
1ˆ
LH ssb +=q ; L
C bs
2
1
=q . (20)
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Using (20) and differentiating the social welfare function (13’) with respect to the
qualities Hs  and Ls  then gives the following first-order conditions,
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-=ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-Û= HHs bsbsSW H q
qqq ˆ
2
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2
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22
, (21a)
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qqq
2
ˆ
2
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0
22
. (21b)
The socially optimal qualities can then be solved from (21a) and (21b) to obtain,
b
swH 5
4 2q= ,
b
swL 5
2 2q
=  and
b
ss wL
w
H 5
2 2q=- . (22)
Like the quality difference in the profit maximizing duopoly case, the socially optimal
quality difference depends positively on the square upper bound of the taste distribution,
2q  and negatively on the marginal cost parameter of quality provision b.
To study the relationship between socially optimal qualities in the duopoly and
social welfare maximization outcomes, we obtain (using equation 12),
00195.0
2
* >=-
b
ss wHH
q , (23a)
0087.0
2
* <-=-
b
ss wLL
q . (23b)
The magnitude of these expressions also depends on the size of the squared upper bound
of the taste distribution, which indicates how many consumers can potentially be
captured by differentiating product qualities. In contrast to the fixed cost case, the profit-
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maximizing duopoly produces too much of the high quality variant and too little of the
low quality variant than would the social planner. Equations (23a) and (23b) indicate that
profit maximization gives a quality dispersion that is too wide. In other words, in order to
relax price competition, firms will behave in a manner that increases the spread of quality
dispersion in order to maximize profits. This behavior decreases social welfare.
Next, we solve for the quality demands under the socially optimal outcome. Using
(22) in (20) and the definition of demands yields )6.01( qq -=wHq  and
24.0 q=wLq .
From the assumptions that 1=-qq  and
L
L
s
p
<q , partial coverage requires that 3.1£q ,
which is consistent with the solutions above. Thus, generally, the market shares for the
high and low quality firms will differ and depend on the size of the upper bound of the
taste distribution q . The market shares will be equal only in two special cases: 1=q , or
666667.0=q . Assuming for the moment that 1=q  so that 0=q , the difference
between total demand in the socially optimal and duopoly outcomes is:
0176252.0)()( >=+-+ ** LH
w
L
w
H qqqq . This implies that production of each variant and
market coverage are both too small under the duopoly.  We summarize these findings in:
Proposition 3. Under variable costs of production, the socially optimal outcome involves
provision of both high and low quality variants. Unlike in the case of a fully covered
market, the market shares of high and low quality variants need not to be equal.
Compared to the socially optimal outcome, the profit maximizing duopoly provides too
much high quality and too little low quality.
19
Intuitively, when the cost of production is variable, price competition, which leads
to increased production, is costly for the firms. To avoid “excessive” price competition
the duopolists restrict production in order to charge prices higher than marginal
production costs. This broadens differentiation between the two variants, because
differentiation is crucial for increasing market share. This is strikingly different from the
well-known result derived in fully covered markets, which states that the size of the
economy’s production of quality is equal under duopoly and socially optimal outcomes
(see Crampes and Hollander 1995). Our new finding may have important policy
implications for achieving efficient levels of quality in markets.
Our Proposition 3 complements existing literature in an interesting way. In
monopolistic markets, Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Cooper (1984) show that there will
be quality distortions for all qualities below the highest quality. Thus, the monopoly sells
a lower than socially optimal quality to all consumers having lower tastes than the
maximum. In a variant of the standard model, Srinagesh and Bradburd (1989)
demonstrate that there will be no quality distortion at the bottom quality level, and there
will be enhancement of all qualities for higher consumer tastes. By using a version of the
Mussa and Rosen (1978) model with the duopoly competition, we have demonstrated that
both bottom and top qualities become distorted under duopolistic price competition.9
Finally, it is interesting to compare the features of socially optimal quality
provision under fixed and variable costs. The major difference between these two cases is
as follows. Under fixed costs only one quality variant of the good is provided.  Both
variants are optimal under variable costs, and in addition provision of the high quality
9 We would like to thank the referee for pointing out how Proposition 3 is related to literature in
monopolistic competition.
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variant is greater than in the case of fixed production costs. In a duopoly equilibrium, we
also showed that the quality spread is too wide under variable costs. Under fixed costs, a
duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum
(characterized by just one variant).
4. Conclusion
We have considered vertical product differentiation under the assumption of partial
market coverage to characterize the social welfare and profit maximizing duopoly
outcomes in terms of quality provision and quantities produced.  We analyzed this issue
both under fixed and variable convex costs of production.  Under the assumption of fixed
costs, the high quality firm has higher profits and greater market share than the low
quality firm. Unlike in the duopoly equilibrium, however, we demonstrated that it is
socially optimal to provide only the single (high) quality commodity and to set low
quality production to zero. As production is costless, the social planner should charge a
uniform price that just covers the costs of quality provision.  This socially optimal pricing
entails serving half of the market, which interestingly is less than the duopoly serves.
planner should charge a uniform price that just covers the costs of quality provision.
Finally, comparing social welfare maximizing and duopoly outcomes, we find that the
spread of product differentiation is too wide under variable costs. Under fixed costs, two
variants will be produced in the duopoly, but quality will be too low.
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Appendix: Social welfare and pricing under fixed costs
Given the socially optimal quality
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where cq  is the critical value of taste parameter. Recall that
2
qq =c  when the price is set
to cover costs of quality provision. Using this, social welfare becomes,
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Suppose now that the price is set at a higher level, Wpp >¢ . Under a higher price the
indifference relation, 0=¢-¢ ps wq , implies cqq >¢ .  Suppose that 0>=-¢ zqq c .
Under this higher price, the social welfare function is given by,
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Solving the resulting social welfare yields,
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Taking the difference
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The result that (A.5) is positive demonstrates that pricing by Wpp >¢ is suboptimal.  This
provides the basis for Proposition 2.
